How do frictions in the banking sector travel through the corporate economy? Using a novel dataset of inter-firm credit sales, I investigate an important channel for the transmission of credit shocks: the trade credit channel. I find that suppliers exposed to a large and exogenous decline in bank financing reduce the volume of trade credit extended to customers, passing the greatest portion of their liquidity shock to their least important customers. Customers linked to liquidity-constrained suppliers suffer declines in both credit quality and employment. Overall, the paper highlights an important causal channel linking the financial sector to widespread corporate outcomes.
Introduction
How did frictions in the financial sector caused by the 2007-08 financial crisis translate into losses in the corporate sector? An important literature examines how, and to what extent, the contraction in bank lending affected corporations (Gan (2007) , Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012) , Chodorow-Reich (2014) ). However, the prior literature primarily focuses on the effect of bank health on their directly linked borrowers. Given the extensive linkages among firms in the real economy, I ask whether frictions in the banking sector can impact non-financial firms even if the firm is not directly linked to the troubled financial sector itself. Specifically, I investigate an important mechanism that may transmit shocks from troubled banks to the rest of the economy: the trade credit channel.
Trade credit, or delayed payment for intermediate goods, plays a substantial and well documented role in financing inter-firm trade. Indeed, the Bank for International Settlements (2014) estimates that two thirds of global trade is supported by trade credit. Moreover, from the perspective of an individual firm, trade credit represents an important source of financing (DemirgucKunt and Maksimovic (2001) ). Given the magnitude and importance of this source of financing, it is reasonable to believe that a liquidity shortage that affects firms' trade credit lending could have negative consequences for downstream firms. Consistent with the idea that firms are exposed to credit risk through their trading partners, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model the propogation of liquidity shocks through networks of firms due to trade credit defaults. They show that if one firm defaults on trade credit, the linked firm is also more likely to default. Therefore, the goal of this paper is simple: to document which types of trade relationships suffer most when there is a contraction in the supply of bank credit. In other words, does a supplier that suffers an economic shock (due to a contraction in the supply of bank credit) pass this shock on to its downstream customers? If so, which customers suffer the greatest losses?
The role of interconnections in spreading adverse shocks was prominently discussed in the popular press during the recent global recession. In particular, there was concern that auto supplier bankruptcies might exacerbate auto manufacturers' own financial woes; this concern prompted the U.S. government to offer $5 billion in aid to the troubled suppliers. There was also concern that suppliers were tightening their financing terms to retailers and often requiring cash in advance or cash on delivery. 1 Whether this credit channel was an economically significant source of distress in the corporate sector remains an open question in the academic literature.
Studying the link between banking shocks and the trade credit channel is challenging for two main reasons. First, identifying the causal effect of the financial crisis on corporate decisions requires the researcher to disentangle the shortage of credit supply from the reduction in demand from the corporate sector. This is particularly problematic during the crisis period when demand for liquidity shrank dramatically. The second challenge in testing the research question is that identifying the mechanism for the transmission of the banking shock -the trade credit channelrequires granular data on the terms and balances of trade credit transactions.
The prior literature suffers from both of these challenges. Specifically, relying on changes in macroeconomic conditions to identify changes in bank lending makes it difficult to identify a causal mechanism between bank credit and trade credit. Further, most prior studies rely on aggregate trade credit amounts from a firm's balance sheet. This limitation makes it virtually impossible to identify multi-chain credit links and to observe the credit shock passing from borrowers to other members in their supply chain network. My paper overcomes these challenges in two ways.
First, in order to identify a causal channel between bank credit and trade credit, I follow Almeida et al. (2012) and consider the fraction of long-term debt coming due during the initial phase of the 2007-2008 financial crisis; the novelty of this identification strategy lies in an ability to separate a pure supply-side shock from the effects of a simultaneous reduction in demand. Second, I rely on a proprietary database of detailed trade credit transactions between buyers and sellers. The data not only provides the identity of buyer-supplier pairs, but it also identifies the volume of trade credit extended for every transaction executed between a buyer and a seller. The resulting dataset is a panel of monthly trade credit balances and the aging reports for each seller-buyer pair. Importantly, the seller-buyer pairs transact on a repeated basis and report at high frequency (monthly), enabling me to more tightly identify causal effects of a shock to bank credit on trade credit behavior.
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether, on average, a banking shock will influence a borrower's trade credit policy. Conceptually, a contraction in the supply of bank lending should only have a causal impact on the bank's direct borrowers. However, introducing linked production networks with shared financial exposures opens the possibility of an indirect link between bank lending and corporations. Specifically, inter-firm trade credit exposures imply that liquidity spillovers may pass from the bank to the economy through the trade credit channel. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that credit chains make up a channel through which liquidity shocks can pass from one firm to their linked counterparties.
The empirical approach I take is to exploit ex ante variation in corporate debt maturity. Specifically, I identify a treatment sample of firms that have a significant percentage of their long-term debt with a scheduled maturity date in the initial phase of the credit crisis. The underlying assumption in the identification strategy is that variation in the ex ante agreed upon maturity dates of corporate debt is exogenous to the observable and unobservable characteristics that drive trade credit behavior after the credit crisis ensued. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that suppliers in the treatment group shrink the supply of trade credit offered to buyers significantly more than suppliers in the control group. The evidence suggests that banking shocks have an economically significant spillover effect to the downstream supply chain.
After I've established that banking shocks influence trade credit behavior, I then ask whether these results are surprising. More specifically, is there reason to expect that some firms might not pass their credit shock on to customers? The theoretical literature suggests that withholding trade credit is costly; Cunat (2007) and Wilner (2000) view trade credit as an insurance mechanism between trading partners and argue that suppliers lend to customers in order to 'lock in' future rents. In other words, trade credit is an important competitive tool used to retain financially important clients. Based on these models, I predict that suppliers will differentially shrink the supply of trade credit to less important customers. To test these theories, I identify economically important relationships based on the number of years that the buyer and seller have been trading and based on the ease with which a buyer can be replaced. Consistent with predictions, I find that suppliers pass a larger portion of their banking shock on to less important customers. These crosssectional results are important, because they show that some trade relationships are shielded from the liquidity spillovers from the banking sector.
The final analyses question whether the trade credit transmission channel is economically important. In particular, do downstream firms -only linked to the financial sector shock through the trade credit channel -suffer real economic consequences? It is not clear, ex ante, whether the shock is large and persistent enough to result in measurable negative effects. For example, if customers can simply shift to alternative sources of financing (including their more liquid suppliers), the negative effects of the trade credit channel might be mitigated. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that the shocks will propogate through the supply chain until they reach unconstrained firms with ample access to external finance ("deep pockets"). To test whether the liquidity shock manifests in negative outcomes for downstream firms, I identify customers that are linked to suppliers in the treatment group (exposed customers). I perform a difference-in-differences analysis where the exposed customers are assigned to the treatment group and unexposed customers are assigned to the control group.
My first set of buyer-side tests examine whether the liquidity shock impacts the buyer's credit quality. Jorion and Zhang (2009) and Boissay and Gropp (2007) argue that linked firms suffer from credit contagion; liquidity shocks are likely to cause a chain reaction of defaults through the supply chain. The evidence is consistent with credit contagion; buyers exposed to liquidity constrained suppliers are more likely to pay their own lenders late, are more likely to have their credit balances transferred to a collection agency, and are more likely to violate bank loan covenants.
In the final test, I examine whether the trade credit channel can influence real outcomes for downstream firms. The outcome I investigate is the change in the level of employment. I find that buyers that are exposed to the trade credit liquidity channel reduce employment more after their exposure, relative to a control sample of unexposed buyers. I find that this result is concentrated amongst small firms that are likely to be more constrained in their alternative liquidity sources.
Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that there are economically meaningful effects of liquidity transmission through the trade credit channel.
My paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the paper is related to a series of studies that find that firms that are linked in the supply chain also have linked fundamentals (Cohen and Frazzini (2008) ) and are exposed to negative shocks such as bankruptcies, financial distress, and natural disasters (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) , Jorion and Zhang (2009), Hortacsu, Matvos, Syverson, and Venkataraman (2013) , Barrot and Sauvagnat (2014) ). The primary innovation of the paper is to provide detailed evidence on a causal mechanism -the trade credit channel -that transmits financial shocks from one firm to their linked counterparty. Observ-ing how an exogenous shock to trade credit influences downstream firms aids in understanding an important mechanism behind the correlations documented in prior research.
I also contribute to the literature that investigates the role of the banking sector crisis in corporate sector outcomes. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that bank syndicates linked to Lehman Brothers reduced lending by a significant amount after the financial crisis, relative to syndicates unexposed to the Lehman bankruptcy. Chodorow-Reich (2014)), Gan (2007) , and Almeida et al. (2012) link the contraction in the supply of credit to a reduction in the borrowers' investment and employment levels. My study builds on this work by identifying an important, yet indirect, link between the credit crisis in the financial sector and corporate sector outcomes. Namely, I show that frictions in the banking sector can impact non-financial firms even if the firm is not directly linked to the troubled financial sector itself. This indirect effect is economically significant and may continue to propogate and even amplify further down the credit chain (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ).
Finally, I contribute to the literature on trade credit. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Biais and Gollier (1997) model the link between bank trade and trade credit and show that trade lenders may be willing to lend when banks ration credit because suppliers have an informational advantage over banks. They conclude that trade credit exists to serve an important financing role; when firms are rationed bank credit, they borrow more from their suppliers in order to fulfill their credit needs. The prior literature primarily focuses on single relationships -one buyer-supplier pairand argues that buyers respond to credit rationing by borrowing from upstream suppliers. My paper departs from these prior studies by investigating the impact of credit constraint from the point of view of the supplier. Since most trade credit lending flows downstream (Costello (2017) ), I question whether shocks to the supplier's bank credit influence their trade credit offered to the customer. Since the credit crisis was large in magnitude and universally impacted borrowers, it is not clear that firms can fully compensate for their credit constraint by borrowing upstream.
Indeed, I show that alternative sources of liquidity do not fully substitute for the reduction in bank lending.
The paper proceeds as follows, Section 2 outlines the framework I rely on for my main predictions, Section 3 describes the setting and the identification strategy, Section 4 describes some notable features of the data, Section 5 presents the main results, Section 6 discusses the outcomes of the trade credit channel on buyers, Section 7 presents robustness tests, and Section 8 concludes.
Conceptual Framework
Recent literature documents an important causal link between the supply of credit and borrower outcomes such as employment levels and investment spending (Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Almeida et al. (2012) ). Conceptually, a contraction in the supply of bank lending should only have a causal impact on the bank's direct borrowers. However, introducing linked production networks with shared financial exposures in the form of trade credit opens the possibility that liquidity spillovers may pass from the bank, through the supply chain. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that credit chains make up a channel through which liquidity shocks can pass from one firm to their linked counterparties.
While the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model focuses on the propagation of default shocks to upstream networks, my paper questions whether a liquidity shock similarly passes downstream.
There are several reasons why borrowers might transfer their liquidity shortage to their customers.
Since a banking shock increases the borrower's cost of credit, it should also increase the supplier's opportunity cost of allowing customers to pay late (Murfin and Njoroge (2014) ). Further, a large source of funding for trade credit includes securitized, or accounts receivable backed, debt (Flannery and Wang (2011) ). This type of bank lending contract allows the borrower to increase debt capacity in proportion to the borrowing base (receivables). Therefore, if an additional dollar of trade credit lent is compensated by an additional dollar of bank credit, the supplier's liquidity position is left unchanged. 2 One can easily see that shrinking the supply of borrowing base debt increases the cost of providing trade credit. 3 It is not obvious, however, that credit shocks will necessarily pass to downstream firms. The trade credit literature -in particular, the financing theory of trade credit -suggests that when 2 I assume that the interest rate on bank debt is less than or equal to the interest rate the supplier charges on trade debt.
3 It is also important to note that suppliers can reduce the liquidity risk of providing trade credit by selling their receivables to a factoring firm. See, for example, Klapper (2006) and Mian and Smith (1992) . However, over the crisis period the supply of credit from the factoring industry shrank dramatically. Further, the trade credit insurance market dried up, as insurance companies pulled existing policies and limited new policies. Thus, relative to other periods, factoring and credit insurance were less viable as alternatives to bank loans for all suppliers. rationed bank credit, troubled suppliers will simply borrow more from their own suppliers in order to fulfill their demand for liquidity. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Biais and Gollier (1997) model the link between trade credit and bank credit and show that trade lenders may be willing to lend when banks ration credit because suppliers have an informational advantage over banks.
That is, if the shock to bank credit differentially affects more opaque borrowers, I may observe trade creditors (suppliers) providing more credit due to superior monitoring skills. Consistent with these arguments, Petersen and Rajan (1997) use aggregate accounts receivable from firms' balance sheets to show that firms with access to more liquidity have higher accounts receivable than constrained firms.
Based on the above discussion, it is an empirical question whether a shortage in the supply of bank credit will cause a supplier to lend less. This leads to the first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A firm facing a liquidity shock from a reduction in the supply of bank credit will pass this liquidity shock to downstream linked firms in the form of reduced trade credit offered.
In investigating the causal effect of a liquidity shock on trade credit, the prior literature highlights the importance of considering relationships. Cunat (2007) and Wilner (2000) view trade credit as an insurance mechanism between suppliers and buyers and argue that suppliers will be more willing to lend to buyers that they are particularly reliant on for future rents. Therefore, providing trade credit is equivalent to an insurance policy; suppliers are willing to provide credit because they are dependent on the viability of their continuing relationship with their customers.
These arguments made in the trade credit literature are similar to the holdup problems related to relationship specific investments (RSIs) (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) , Williamson (1979) , Grossman and Hart (1986) ). Hold-up theories argue that sunk investments in RSIs give the buyer more bargaining power ex post, since the supplier's investments are worth less in an alternative use. Based on these theories, a supplier that is reliant on a subset of customers will be compelled to provide more trade credit, in hopes of retaining the relationship in the future.
Based on these models, I formally predict the following:
Hypothesis 2: A firm facing a liquidity shock from a reduction in the supply of bank credit will differentially shrink the supply of trade credit more to unimportant customers.
Research Setting and Empirical Strategy

The Credit Crisis
To test the main hypotheses, I explore the response of trade credit behavior to variation in bank lending during the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] . The credit crisis offers three main advantages.
First, the origins of the crisis began largely outside of the corporate sector, making it particularly useful in studying the causal effects of a banking sector shock on corporate outcomes. Second, the prior literature shows that during the crisis period, there was a sharp decrease in the supply of bank credit and a corresponding increase in the price of new loans (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) , Santos (2011 ), Chodorow-Reich (2014 ). Therefore, I can be sure that this setting marks a measurable reduction in the supply of bank credit. The final advantage of using the credit crisis as the research setting is that it was marked by a widespread decline in corporate credit quality and other indicators of corporate sector health; many argue that the full magnitude of the economic decline was unlikely solely due to the direct effect of the liquidity shortage on borrowers (Hall 
Identification
Capturing the transmission of a bank lending shock to the trade credit contract between a seller and buyer is challenging from an empirical standpoint, since the demand for liquidity for trading purposes likely changes contemporaneously with the decline in loan supply. This problem is particularly acute in the context of trade credit due to the intrinsic connection with the good underlying the contract. Thus, a demand shock downstream in the supply chain can perturb the seller's demand for bank credit even if he is distant from the buying firm. To help address this challenge, I employ a shock to supplier liquidity that is plausibly exogenous to the trade credit contracting environment.
Following Almeida et al. (2012) I consider the fraction of long-term debt that was prescheduled to come due during the initial phase of the 2007-2008 financial crisis as a shock to supplier financing that is exogenous to changes in the buyer-supplier relationship at the onset of the crisis. In this way, I argue that I can capture exogenous variation in the opportunity cost to a supplier of providing trade credit to buyers. In frictionless capital markets, the maturity date of bank debt should not influence trading relationships since firms can easily renew their debt agreements. However, the credit crisis of 2007-08 introduced frictions to the credit markets that made it more costly to refinance maturing debt. Importantly, assignment of this shock is predetermined by the capital structure decisions (both start dates and lengths of the contract) accumulated over the years leading to the crisis. Therefore firms that, by chance, had a large portion of their debt scheduled to mature in mid-2007 should be faced with larger financing constraints than firms that did not face loan renewal during this period. The key identification assumption is that the maturity date of long-term debt is orthogonal to supplier-customer characteristics that determine any changes in demand for trade credit around the crisis.
The assumption that the credit crisis introduced frictions that had a significant impact on borrowers is extensively documented prior work. Specifically, the treatment period was marked by sharply increased tension in markets for commercial paper, corporate debt, and equity issuance.
Additionally, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that new bank loans to large borrowers fell by 79 percent between the second quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2008. Taken together, the evidence suggests that it was costly if not impossible to switch to alternative sources of liquidity at short notice. Consequently, firms were forced to replace maturing debt largely by adjusting the asset side of the balance sheet. Almeida et al. (2012) show that, following a shock to the supply of bank credit, treated firms cut investments at a significantly higher rate than control firms. sector shock on corporate sector outcomes, it is important to note that while the treatment period corresponds to volatility in financial markets, it largely precedes the widespread deterioration in the corporate sector. 5 My assumption is that the assignment to the treatment group is exogenous to trade credit outcomes. It is possible, however, that treatment and control firms differ along some dimensions, which might be correlated with the outcome variables and would bias the DD estimation. To address this issue, I control for firms' pretreatment characteristics, as well as their interaction with the after indicator. These controls help to alleviate the concern that my results might be driven by pretreatment variation between the treatment and control groups. They also prevent bias if the treatment and control groups respond differently to macroeconomic fluctuations.
Main Specification
The DD approach compares the amount of trade credit offered during the treatment period to 4 Both treatment and control firms must have some loans outstanding at the month before treatment. 5 Cutting the period off at August 2008 is also useful in disentangling the direct effect of the financial crisis on downstream buyer firms from the more indirect, trade credit channel, effect on downstream buyers. If I extend the sample period further through the crisis, my ability to disentangle these effects is more difficult since most firms suffered losses.
the amount offered during a pre-period beginning in June 2006, for both treatment and control firms. The DD is estimated by OLS using the following specification:
where i indexes suppliers and j indexes buyers. After is a dummy variable equal to one from the beginning of treatment through August 2008, and Treated is a dummy indicating whether the firm has more than 20% of their debt maturing during the initial crisis period. As mentioned above, I include time-invariant control variables, interacted with the After indicator. 6 The controls do not enter into the regression separately because they are absorbed by the fixed effects. All controls are measured by taking their average over the pre-period. Specifically, I control for size (measured by total assets), liquidity (measured by cash and cash-equivalents over total assets), firm age (measured as the number of quarters since a supplier was first observed in Compustat), and number of buyers (measured as the total number of buyers for a given supplier). The controls follow Petersen and Rajan (1997) , and are meant to capture variation in firm-specific observable characteristics that might be correlated with selection into the treatment. I include an exhaustive set of fixed effects to capture time invariant characteristics of the supplier and buyer as well as bilateral supplier-buyer relationships. I also include buyer-time fixed effects in order to absorb buyer-specific idiosyncratic shocks and the associated changes in the demand for trade credit. Additional fixed effects for the supplier's long-term debt rating are also used in all specifications. Finally, the main specifications include indicators for the pre-period (the five months prior to the beginning of the treatment period) interacted with the Treatment indicator in order to assess any pre-treatment trends. The fixed effects, in concert with the identifying assumption of orthogonality of treatment, provide a strong basis to draw causal inference.
6 I elect to use a specification with time-invariant controls in order to avoid confounding inferences of the effect on credit extended. Parallel trends are established during the pre-period on the dependent variable of interest, absent time-varying controls. The primary challenge to identification is therefore the question of selection into the treatment and control groups. Using time invariant controls address this directly by absorbing the treatment effect that would be attributable to factors that are expected to generate a selection problem (i.e., size and age). In this sense, the coefficient I measure coincides in a natural way with the DD interpretation, whereas time-varying controls would be akin to observing treatment in the space orthogonal to the span of the control variables.
Data
The primary innovation of the paper is to document the trade credit channel as an important channel for liquidity spillovers from the financial sector to the corporate sector. To do so, I rely on a novel and proprietary dataset that contains disaggregated data on accounts receivable for supplier-buyer pairs. These data are obtained from Credit2B, a third party credit information platform and reporting service that relies on real-time industry trade reporting. The company produces risk scores for millions of customers worldwide, based on credit bureau data, financial filings, news, and trade payment data collected from their member firms. In order to become a member firm, suppliers are required to produce a monthly report disclosing all transactions with customers; the report contains the current receivables and past due balances for their universe of buyers. In other words, all members must make a monthly upload of every transaction made with every customer. 7 The data also includes a receivables aging report for each transaction. Past due balances are reported for each customer broken into 30 day buckets. Importantly, the information is only used by the management team at Credit2B to produce a risk score for the customer, which is then shared with other member firms. Identities of buyer-supplier pairs and their transaction balances are not disclosed to other member firms. This mitigates concerns that self-selection due to reporting incentives might bias the sample, since the detailed transaction data remain private. Table 1 reports limited summary statistics for the full Credit2B sample. 8 The sample covers the years 2001 through 2015 and totals close to ninety-five million trade transactions. In their universe of data, there are forty-eight thousand unique members (suppliers), reporting transactions with 7.3 million unique customers. The average dollar value of receivables that are current (i.e., not past due) is $21,032, while the average dollar value of past due receivables is $8,622. It is important to note that there is significant variation in these balances, with some customers representing a large portion of the receivables extended and some customers representing small, one-time transactions.
Importantly, the suppliers report trade balances on a frequent, monthly basis, allowing me to very precisely identify treatment effects for a given buyer-supplier pair. Additionally, many suppliers share the same customer in a given month, allowing me to control for time-varying customer characteristics in the regression analyses. 9 One striking feature of the data is a substantial reduction in accounts receivable during mid-2007. Figure 2 plots the time series of average current receivables for the universe of suppliers in the Credit2B dataset over the period 2005 through 2010. Consistent with a link between external credit markets and trade credit, the sharp decline in trade credit balances corresponds remarkably tightly to the onset of the turmoil in credit markets. One might question whether the observed reduction is due to cutting receivables on the intensive margin or on the extensive margin. To disentangle these effects, Figure 3 plots the time series of average current receivables including all customers and the time series of average current receivables including only customers that remain in the sample from January 2005 through December 2009. The plot indicates that the decrease in total receivables was largely attributable to decreases in trade credit balances between firms maintaining a persistent relationship, rather than due to firms exiting the sample. I use the transaction-level data to build a panel of matched supplier-buyer pairs. In order to define the treatment effect, I need data on the firm's debt maturity so the next step is to match the firms in the Credit2B dataset to Thomson Reuters' Dealscan database by supplier name. The match is performed using string-matching algorithms in several rounds. After collecting exact matches, I first run a fuzzy match with the set of potential matches restricted to those companies that are headquartered in a matching zip code. Finally, I search for the remaining matches by expanding the set of potential matches to the Dealscan universe over the relevant period. All matches are then verified manually. Many of the suppliers in the sample are either privately held companies or are internationally based. Therefore, the preliminary matching procedure yields a sample of about 1,069 Credit2B companies that are successfully matched to Dealscan. I further apply a number of standard filters to the sample, removing suppliers flagged as factoring companies in the Credit2B database and removing firms with SIC codes corresponding to financial, non-profit, and governmental entities. This yields a sample of 857 unique suppliers.
Dealscan collects loan-level information on firms' syndicated loans. The data includes infor-mation on the characteristics of the loan contract, including borrower identity, loan amount, loan maturity, collateral requirements, covenants, and other features. Using this information, I calculate the percentage of a firm's total debt coming due in the initial phase of the crisis period.
Specifically, I identify loans with a stated maturity date between July 2007 and August 2008. I take two precautions in identifying expiring loans in order to mitigate concerns that my measure may be correlated with borrower characteristics. First, I require the loan to have been initiated before July 2006 in order to ensure that I do not sort on firms that may anticipate the effects of the credit crisis. In this way, I am more confident that I am not simply identifying firms with lower quality managers. Second, I require the loan to have a maturity of at least one year, to ensure I do not capture differences in firms' ability to obtain short-versus long-term debt. Since prior literature shows that debt maturity is correlated with firm characteristics such as size, profitability, and credit ratings (e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995) , Diamond (1993) ), restricting the treatment calculation to only long-term debt helps to mitigate concerns that assignment to treatment is correlated with firm characteristics. 10 For each firm, I take the sum of all loans maturing during the treatment period and divide it by the sum of all loans outstanding at the onset of the crisis. 11 Scaling by total debt outstanding reduces concerns that I am capturing firms with a preference for higher leverage. Further, it allows me to assign a relative strength of treatment to firms with expiring loans. Following Almeida et al. (2012) , I identify treated borrowers as those with greater than 20 percent of their total debt coming due during the crisis period. 12 For much of the analyses, I also control for firm characteristics such as size, age, and liquidity. Therefore, the next step is to match the sample firms to Compustat. I match to Compustat in two phases. First, I use the Dealscan-Compustat linking file provided by Michael Roberts. Next, for those firms not included in the linking file, I directly match to Compustat using the name and zip code. For the specifications that include Compustat controls, the sample of unique suppliers 10 In sensitivity analyses, I incrementally push the start date of loans to at least three years before the crisis. I also extend the loan maturity requirement to a minimum of two years. Finally, I also control for the firm's average loan maturity, in order to mitigate concerns that I somehow capture credit quality. In all of these sensitivity tests, inferences remain unchanged.
11 Almeida et al. (2012) calculate the treatment effect using Compustat's Annual and Quarterly files. Specifically, they calculate the treatment variable as the ratio of long-term debt maturing within one year (dd1) to total long-term debt (dd1+dltt). All analyses in the paper are robust to this alternative treatment. However, I believe that using Dealscan to calculate treatment offers two distinct advantages. First, because Dealscan covers both public and private firms, I am able to obtain a larger sample size by matching the Credit2B data to Dealscan. Second, because Dealscan reports the exact dates that debt matures, I believe that I can more precisely tie my measure of long-term debt maturity to the treatment period of interest, and I can also control for the average debt maturity in the regression. 12 In sensitivity analyses, I vary the threshold used to assign treatment. I find similar results with treatment assigned at 15 percent. The results get stronger as I increase the percentage threshold past 20 percent.
shrinks to 208. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the Credit2B suppliers included in the final sample.
Descriptive Statistics
The firms are well-established; the average age of firms in the sample is 17 years. The suppliers in the sample have an average of close to 8 thousand customers, while the customers in the sample have an average of 9 suppliers.The difference is driven by the structure of the Credit2B business model, which provides information about customers to member firms (suppliers). All member firms report their transactions with customers, but they do not report their transactions with their own suppliers. 13 In order to get a sense of potential issues of selection into the sample, Table 2 provides the sample averages for the Compustat universe during the period of the experiment.
Of note is the difference in the sample firms' sales; it is unsurprising that firms choosing to participate in Credit2B's service are more active in the production of tradeable goods. Based on this difference, one might take caution in extrapolating the results of this study to the population of firms. On balance, however, the sample firms do not seem wholly different from the Compustat universe.
To further understand potential selection into the sample, I tabulate the dispersion in supplier's SIC codes. Table 3 compares the two digit SIC dispersion for the sample as compared to the dispersion for Compustat. The sample firms seem to be a close representation of the industry dispersion in Compustat. The notable differences are the financial services industry (SIC 6067) and the service industry (SIC 7089) . While the population of suppliers in Credit2B includes financial firms (factors), I exclude these firms from the analyses since their behavior during the crisis is likely to differ from that of non-financial corporations.
Treatment versus Control Firms
I assume that the discontinuity around the debt maturity date sorts firms into two groups, such that the only difference between these groups is the supply of bank credit and not differences in other borrower characteristics that might influence trade credit. To provide some evidence toward this assumption, Table 4 reports the covariate balance in the pre-period. I include characteristics of the supplier's loans, firm characteristics, and relationship characteristics. It is encouraging to observe no significant differences in loan characteristics and only small differences in borrower characteristics. Treated firms are slightly smaller and younger than control firms. To ensure that these differences do not drive the results, in the regressions I include a vector of firm controls interacted with the After indicator.
The DID estimator relies on the assumption of parallel trends. To test this assumption, I run the following regression:
,where a t represents an indicator for month t. A test that the interacted coefficients in equation
4.1 representing months in the pre-period are jointly equal to zero yields an F statistic of 0.67, failing to reject the null of parallel trends. Figure 4 plots estimated coefficients on the interacted terms over a bandwith of ten months surrounding the treatment date. As these coefficients represent the estimated difference between treatment and control groups, I would expect no significant difference during the pre-period and a substantial difference once the treatment has occurred. While it appears that treatment is anticipated by one month, I don't believe this merits an immediate rejection of the identification. Specifically, June 2007 marked the first onset of the crisis; it is feasible that trade suppliers anticipated problems and started cutting receivables accordingly.
Results: Liquidity Spillovers to Trade Credit
Recall that Hypothesis 1 predicts that a firm facing a banking liquidity shock will pass this to his supplier in the form of reduced trade credit. To test this hypothesis, I estimate equation 3.1 using ordinary least squares, where the dependent variable is the suppliers' balance of accounts receivable. The level of observation is a unique buyer-supplier-transaction, so the dependent variable represents the credit sales extended by a given supplier to a given buyer. The primary coefficient of interest is the Treated ⇤ A f ter term, which captures the effect of the difference-in-differences.
Standard errors are clustered at the supplier level.
The results from estimating equation 3.1 are reported in Table 5 . In columns 1 through 4, the dependent variable is the log of the current receivables balance, as reported in the monthly receivable logs collected by Credit2B. Note that the balance of current receivables represents new credit sales made to a particular customer in a given month. Since the receivables data is highly positively skewed, I estimate the regression using logs. In addition to the control variables discussed in 3.3, I also include controls for the supplier's long-term debt rating, which should help absorb any remaining variation in credit quality. Further, in all specifications, I include buyer and supplier fixed effects to control for any time-invariant characteristics of the buyer and supplier that may drive trade credit policy. Month fixed effects are included in all specifications to capture any macroeconomic fluctuations that might correlate with lending decisions.
Moving from columns 1 through 4, the fixed effects get progressively more rigorous. In particular, in column 3 I add a supplierXbuyer fixed effect to account for the effect of relationship-type on changes in trade credit, and in column 4 I add a buyerXmonth fixed effect to account for time varying characteristics of the buyer. 14 In all specifications, I find a negative and significant coefficient on the A f ter ⇤ Treated term, suggesting that suppliers experiencing a liquidity shock from their bank reduced the trade credit offered to customers during the crisis period, relative to the control group. The result is economically significant; the coefficient in column 4 of Table 5 suggests that treated suppliers have a 40 percent larger decrease in lending to customers, relative to the control sample.
To this point, I have argued that the banking shock will pass from suppliers to their customers in the form of reduced trade credit. A plausible alternative story is that suppliers will compensate for the reduced liquidity by reducing the quantity of goods supplied, also known as a supply disruption risk (Tomlin (2006), Ellis, Henry, and Shockley (2010) ). 15 A reduction in the supply of goods provided would result in a reduction in all sales, including credit sales. While an interesting story in itself, the goal of the paper is to identify a credit channel for contagion rather than a volume, or production, channel for contagion.
To provide evidence on this front, I replace the dependent variable with receivables scaled by sales. Note that Credit2B does not currently collect information on total sales (credit and cash) for each transaction. Therefore, I scale by the total sales revenue reported in the Compustat Quarterly
File. There are two main limitations in using this scalar. First, the receivables data is reported at much higher frequency than the sales data from Compustat. Second, the Compustat data represents sales to all customers over the quarter, while the level of observation for the receivables data is at the buyer-supplier-transaction level. To mitigate these measurement problems, I take the three-month sum of receivables for each buyer-supplier reported in Credit2B, and I scale by the three-month quarterly sales number reported from Compustat. I believe that the inconsistent measurement of the numerator and the denominator will only introduce noise and not bias in the regression results.
Columns 5 through 7 of Table 5 report the results of estimating equation 3.1, where the dependent variable is receivables scaled by sales. Consistent with columns 1 through 4, I continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on A f ter ⇤ Treated, suggesting that the effect I am capturing is, in fact, a trade credit channel effect. The magnitude of the effect is somewhat difficult to interpret, given that the measurement of sales is at the firm level rather than the firm-customer level.
Overall, the results from Table 5 provide robust evidence that suppliers experiencing a liquidity shock sharply reduce the supply of trade credit offered to customers, relative to the control group. The result is somewhat noteworthy; passing trade credit shocks downstream has largely been ignored by the prior literature, which focuses on passing default risk upstream. Further, the financing theory of trade credit suggests that firms experiencing a liquidity shock may simply borrow more from their own upstream suppliers, reducing the probability that this liquidity shock will be passed downstream (Petersen and Rajan (1997) , Biais and Gollier (1997) , Burkart and Ellingsen (2004)). The results suggest that the supplier's alternative sources of liquidity may not be a perfect substitute for the large reduction in bank credit.
Heterogeneity in the Main Effect: Do relationships matter?
Recall that Hypothesis 2 asks whether suppliers will be more likely to shrink trade credit to less important customers, since these customers are easily replaced. To test this hypothesis, I rely on three relationship characteristics of the buyer-supplier pair in order to identify economically important customers: relationship age, number of buyers, and the buyer's Herfindahl index.
The first variable I use to proxy for relationship strength is based on the number of years that the buyer and seller have been trading. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Antras and Foley (2016) show that relationship length is particularly important for trade credit decisions since it proxies for the importance of that customer in the firm's future rent stream. Suppliers in the The second proxy for relationship strength is the total number of alternative buyers that a supplier has a relationship with. The argument I make for using this variable is motivated by the literature on relationship specific investments. Specifically, a supplier with a single customer may face hold up problems since their produce is worth less in an alternative use (Klein et al. (1978) , Williamson (1979) , Grossman and Hart (1986) ). Therefore, the supplier is more reliant on rents from a small potential pool of customers than he would be with many replacement options. The final proxy I use for relationship strength is the customer's Herfindahl Index (HHI). The variable, HHI should capture how competitive the buyer's industry is; lower values indicate higher competition while values close to one indicate a monopolistic market. My motivation behind using HHI is very similar to that for my second proxy for relationship strength. Instead of capturing existing relationships, however, the HHI captures the potential future buyers that the supplier might shift to. Since the supplier will be more reliant on rents from the monopolist, I
expect him to cut a greater portion of receivables to buyers in competitive markets.
To estimate the effects of relationship closeness on trade credit after the financial shock, I estimate equation 3.1, splitting the full sample of suppliers into two sub-samples based on the relationship proxy. Specifically, I divide suppliers into a High and Low category based on the median values of Relationship Age, N Buyers, and HHI, respectively. 16 The dependent variable is the log of current receivables, and all specifications include the full set of fixed effects. Note that according to Hypothesis 2, I expect a larger reduction in receivables for low Relationship Age, for high N Buyer, and for low HHI. Table 6 reports the results. Consistent with predictions, I find that suppliers pass a larger portion of their banking shock on to less important customers. The first two columns in Table 6 show that the DD coefficient is substantially more negative for the subsample estimated on low Relationship Age. For newer customer relationships, the decrease in trade credit after the banking shock is 45 percent larger than the decrease in trade credit for the control firms.
The second two columns in Table 6 tell a similar story; for the subsample of suppliers that have a lot of replacement buyers, the treated firms decrease trade credit more after the shock, relative to the control firms. 17 Columns 5 and 6 report the results using HHI as the relationship attribute.
I fail to find a significant effect for either the Low or the High subgroups. While inconclusive, I
suspect that the proxy is not precisely capturing relationship closeness. 18 Taken together, the results in Table 6 provide substantial evidence suggesting that suppliers 'rebalance' their smaller pool of liquidity toward more important customers. This is consistent with models of trade credit in which an equilibrium is supported by a breakup cost of the relationship as in Cunat (2007) and Wilner (2000) . 19
Buyer Outcomes
Having established that suppliers facing a liquidity shock pass this shock on to their downstream customers, I next move to whether this trade credit channel is economically meaningful. In particular, do customers recover from their exposure to the liquidity shock? If the buyer's exposure is minimal, or if the buyer has sufficient outside capital, then the trade credit channel should have 16 Note that this does not split the samples equally, since I assign the split based on a supplier characteristic, but the regressions are estimated at the transaction level.
17 A test of the differences in coefficients reveals that the coefficients of interest in columns 1 and 2 and in columns 3 and 4 are statistically different from each other.
18 I also estimate heterogeneity across degrees of closeness by taking the leave-one-out percentage of current receivable for each buyer-supplier pair as the dependent variable. To do so, I create a fully balanced panel by adding zeros to those buyers that exit the sample in order to remove any effect on the extensive margin. The results of this specification are substantively similar to those reported in Table 6 (untabulated). an insignificant influence on non-financial firms. Alternatively, customers may not be able to fully absorb the credit shock, which could manifest in a deterioration in credit quality or other operational changes. 20 In the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model of credit chains, a liquidity shock will propagate through the supply chain until the chain reaches a 'deep pocket.' Deep pockets can absorb the liquidity shock because they have access to sufficient internal or external capital, and are therefore not credit constrained.
To examine whether buyers exposed to the trade credit channel are worse off after the exposure, I first ask whether their credit quality shifts after the exposure. As in the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model, a buyer that is directly linked to a distressed firm may also suffer distress due to the credit contagion. Alternatively, the financing theory of trade credit suggests that a financially constrained buyer can simply borrow more from his unconstrained suppliers. This, in turn, eases the buyer's liquidity constraints. Several theoretical models explain why a seller may be able to provide cheaper financing than a bank, including his informational advantage (Smith (1987) , Biais and Gollier (1997) , and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) ), a higher collateral value due to easier liquidation (Longhofer and Santos (2003) and Frank and Maksimovic (1998) ) or the desire to continue the relationship (Cunat (2007) and Wilner (2000)). 21 The empirical literature supports this financing role of trade credit by showing that more liquid suppliers extend more credit (Petersen and Rajan (1997) , Nilsen (2002) , and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013)). The financing theories of trade credit typically assume that trade credit and bank credit are perfect substitutes; if a buyer is financially constrained, his trade creditor will fully accommodate his demand for liquidity (Biais and Gollier (1997) ). It is possible, however, that untreated suppliers might hit their budget constraint and not be able to fully compensate for the customers' increased demand for credit. 22 This discussion leads to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Buyers exposed to the liquidity shock through the trade credit channel exhibit a deterioration in credit quality after treatment.
To test Hypothesis 3, I sort customers into two groups: those that are linked to the treated suppliers at the time of treatment (Exposed Buyers) and those that are not linked to treated suppliers (Unexposed Buyers). Note that the identification strategy hinges on the assumption that the treatment is only based on the random assignment of the supplier's debt maturity dates, rather than any characteristics related to the supplier or the customer himself. If my assumption holds, sorting into Exposed versus Unexposed buyers should be exogenous to buyer characteristics.
To test the hypothesis, I estimate the following equation, using OLS:
,where i indexes suppliers and j indexes buyers. In order to maintain the DD assumption of parallel trends, I include time invariant controls, interacted with the After indicator. Specifically, I control for buyer size (measured by total assets), buyer liquidity (measured by cash and cashequivalents over total assets), buyer age (measured as the number of quarters since a buyer was first observed in Compustat), and number of suppliers (measured as the total number of suppliers for a given buyer). As in the main specification, I include several levels of fixed effects, and the level of observation is a unique buyer-supplier-transaction. The primary coefficient of interest is the ExposedBuyer ⇤ A f ter term, which captures the effect of the difference-in-differences model. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
The first measure of credit quality I consider is the buyers' ability to repay the trade claims to their suppliers in a timely manner after receiving additional trade credit. 23 The richness of the Credit2B data allows me to pin down these late payments. In particular, Credit2B asks their members (supplier firms) to identify the 'days slow' for each transaction. I use the variable Days Slow to capture the number of days past the agreed upon due date that the customer is delayed in his payment to the supplier.
My second measure of credit quality is the percentage of all receivables that get transferred to a later past due aging bucket. Member firms all provide an aging report for each transaction, identifying the current balance, the past due balance, and the past due balance broken out into 23 Regressions are estimated by leaving out all transactions with treated suppliers. buckets of thirty day increments. These aging reports allow me to see the volume of credit and its movement from current buckets through past due buckets. 24 I use the proxy Percentage Aged to capture the percentage of the buyer's payables that move through the late payment buckets.
Specifically, it is calculated by comparing two consecutive aging reports and identifying the percentage of payables that moved to later buckets. 25 The final two proxies that I use to capture credit quality are (1) the likelihood that the buyer's payable is transferred to a collection agency and (2) the probability that the buyer violates a covenant in their contracts with outside lenders. I obtain both of these proxies from Experian and Equifax reports 26 ; these credit-reporting bureaus collect data from collection agencies to incorporate into their assigned credit scores. 27 The proxy Collections is an indicator variable equal to one if the customer is recorded by these sources as having balances that were transferred to collection agencies. The proxy Covenant Viol. is an indicator variable equal to one if the customer violated one of their debt covenants, as reported by Experian and Equifax.
To test whether exposed customers pay their bills late, I estimate equation 6.1 for all of the buyer's transactions with untreated suppliers. The dependent variable is either Days Slow, Volume Aged, Collections, or Covenant Viol.. The results are reported in Table 7 . Column 1 reports that, relative to the control sample of unexposed customers, exposed customers pay their suppliers an average of 8 days later. With an average due date of 30 days after invoicing, the result is economically significant. Similarly, column 2 reports that the total percentage of payables passing through the late buckets is larger for exposed customers than it is for unexposed customers. Columns 3 and 4 report that exposed customers are more likely to default on their trade credit and their bank credit, respectively. Exposed buyers have a higher likelihood of having their trade payables passed to collection agencies after the exposure, relative to the control sample of unexposed buyers. Similarly, exposed buyers are more likely to violate their debt covenants after exposure to the trade credit channel shock, relative to the control sample of unexposed buyers. 24 Due to the granularity and frequency of reporting, I can see how each of these buckets changes from one month to the next. Therefore, I can precisely observe the aging process. 25 The following illustration better defines my proxy. In January, a supplier reports that their customer's $100 receivable balance is 31 to 60 days delayed. In February, the supplier reports a $80 receivable balance for the same customer in the 61-90 day bucket. One can clearly see that 80% was aged while 20% was paid or settled.
26 Credit2B has data sharing agreements with Experian and Equifax 27 Further, Credit2B is also directly partnered with three large collection agencies. Identities and volumes of receivables passed from suppliers to collections are included in this data.
Taken together, the results in Table 7 strongly indicate that exposed customers exhibit behaviors consistent with financial constraint. Following exposure to the trade credit channel, exposed customers pay their bills later and are more likely to default on their credit, relative to unexposed buyers. It is important to point out that the evidence in Table 7 is not wholly inconsistent with the financing theory of trade credit. It is possible that exposed buyers borrow some funds from their more liquid suppliers, but the additional credit from suppliers is not sufficient to suppress the negative effects of the liquidity spillover from the treated suppliers. This result is important in light of the literature that suggests that trade credit and bank credit are perfect substitutes. In this setting, it appears that the more liquid suppliers do not have sufficiently 'deep pockets.' As a result, I document default spillovers, consistent with the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model of credit shocks. 28
Buyer Real Effects
While I document that the exposed suppliers increase their borrowing from untreated suppliers, in the previous section I also show that their credit quality declines. They are more likely to pay late and to have their balances transferred to collection agencies. 29 The final question I address is whether the trade credit channel can have real effects on linked firms, aside from affecting their liquidity and credit quality.
The real effect I study is whether trade credit exposure influences employment. I ask whether firms linked to the financial sector shock -only through their trade credit exposure -are more likely to cut employment after the treatment, relative to a control sample of firms that are not linked through the trade credit channel. There are a number of reasons that the trade credit channel may influence a firm's employment. First, Chodorow-Reich (2014) shows that firms that are directly linked to the financial sector shock are more likely to cut employment. Having established that direct borrowers of troubled banks cut employment, I ask whether the effect can travel through the supply chain. 28 Note that the results in Table 7 are inconsistent with the story that a treated supplier passes the liquidity shock on to their customers by reducing the volume of goods provided. If that were the case, I would expect the customers to simply shift their raw material purchases to existing or new suppliers, without a contemporaneous effect on their credit quality. 29 In untabulated results, I also find that they are more likely to violate their bank loan covenants. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a deterioration in overall credit quality. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) show that trade credit serves an important financing role, particularly when banking institutions are weak. If firms use trade credit to finance payroll, a shock to the supply of trade credit may necessitate layoffs. The link between trade credit and employment may also be indirect. If the shock to trade credit increases the exposed buyer's cost of capital, he may optimally shrink output and labor demand. This leads to the final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Exposed buyers, who are only linked to the financial sector shock through the trade credit channel, have a larger decrease in employment after the shock, relative to a control sample of unexposed buyers.
To provide evidence on the employment outcome, I collect employment data from Compustat. A downside to this data is that it is only reported for public firms, and it is reported at the parent level, while the Credit2B data is at the establishment level. Further, the prior literature suggests that the effects of bank credit on employment should concentrate in smaller, private firms (Chodorow-Reich (2014)), therefore relying on the public subsample may bias against finding results.
I estimate equation 6.1 , where Employment is the dependent variable. 30 The results are tabulated in column 1 of Table 8 . I fail to find evidence that exposed buyers have a greater decline in employment than unexposed buyers. However, as documented by prior literature, smaller firms reduced employment by much more than those in the largest class size (Chodorow-Reich (2014)).
Therefore, I split the sample at the median of the buyers' size, and I estimate the regression for each subsample. Column 3 of Table 8 reveals that there is a significant decline in employment for the smaller firms in the sample. This final result is particularly important in light of the widespread corporate distress following the banking shock. It highlights an important and not previously studied channel through which the banking sector shocks spread to non-financial firms.
Robustness of Primary Results
The primary concern with my identification strategy is that the treatment is functioning through a correlation with an omitted factor that predicts both the timing of debt contract expiry and changes in trade credit. While the claim of randomness of maturity profile is quite plausible, I include a number of robustness checks to explore this possibility. First, I perform a falsification test wherein the analysis is moved backward by one year. This places the treatment date at August, 2006. The results of this falsification test are reported in Table 9 . Reassuringly, the coefficient of interest, A f ter ⇤ Treated, is insignificant in all specifications when pulling the treatment effect back one year.
A remaining concern is that the treatment group selects firms whose managers were least able to foresee the financial crisis. Those that anticipated the crisis (i.e., high quality managers) negotiated debt contracts with maturity dates after 2008, while those that did not anticipate the crisis (i.e., low quality managers) obtained debt contracts with maturities in the heart of the crisis. In order to explore this possibility, I run the analyses with the treatment assigned up to three years in advance. Results are robust to this specification.
A final concern is that the treatment sorts firms based on credit risk. If poor quality firms are only able to get short-term loans (i.e., one year or less), they are more likely to have some portion of their debt mature during the crisis period. It is worth noting that the treatment operates on long-term debt (greater than one year) in order to avoid selection of firms that were unable to borrow long-term. However, there may still be concern that variation in agreed upon maturities for contracts greater than one year may predict the probability of falling in the treatment group and may be correlated with credit quality. While I control for the firm's long-term debt rating in all analyses, in untabulated tests I also control for the average maturity of the firm's outstanding debt agreements. All results are robust to these additional controls.
Alternative Treatments
In order to validate the identification strategy and to increase the external validity of the tests beyond the 2007-2008 period, I reassign treatment following Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) . In particular, the authors predict that variation in bank health before the crisis influences the bank's ability to lend during the crisis. Chodorow-Reich (2014) argues that since the origins of the financial crisis started in the banking sector rather than the corporate sector, variation in the bank's ability to lend during the crisis is plausibly orthogonal to borrower characteristics. Therefore, the author argues that these exogenous differences in bank health have a causal effect on borrower employment levels.
To measure credit availability to borrower b during the crisis period, I follow Chodorow-Reich Chodorow-Reich (2014) further acknowledges that unobserved characteristics of borrowers that affect loan demand might be correlated at the lender level, causing the change-in-lending variable to be biased. Therefore, the change in loans is instrumented with three sets of variables.
Lehman Exposure is calculated as the fraction of the bank's syndication portfolio where Lehman Brothers had a lead role (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) ); the second instrument uses the banks' exposure to mortgage-backed securities (ABX); the third set of instruments uses bank balance sheet and income statement items including Trading Revenue/Assets, Real estate chargeoffs/assets, and Bank deposits/assets. Each of these instruments is purported to influence borrower outcomes only through their effect on the bank's change in lending behavior.
To measure the effect of a change in bank health on borrower outcomes, I follow the prior literature and regress the percentage change in current receivables (measured between March 2008 and March 2009) on the change in loans from the borrower's syndicate members. Table 10 reports the results. Column 1 reports the results from an OLS regression where the change in loans is the independent variable of interest, while columns 2 through 5 report the results where the change in loans is instrumented with each of the variables discussed above. The results are strongly significant in all specifications, and they indicate that borrowers with a tighter loan supply lend less trade credit to their downstream customers. Though preliminary, the results in Table 10 lend credence to the main findings relating the supply of bank liquidity to trade credit.
Conclusion
I identify an important and unstudied channel that links shocks in the banking sector to corporate sector outcomes: the trade credit channel. Using a plausibly exogenous shock to the supply of bank credit, I first show that the supply of credit is causally linked to the trade credit that a borrower lends to his customers. Second, I show that the trade credit channel is economically important. Customers that are exposed to treated suppliers borrow more from alternative suppliers in an attempt to close the funding gap. Ultimately, the substitution effect is not sufficient and buyers suffer negative outcomes. Exposed buyers are more likely to pay their bills late, have their balances transferred to collection agencies, and are more likely to cut employment, relative to a control sample of unexposed buyers.
My findings contribute to the literature on the effects of the 2007 financial crisis on corporations. While the prior literature shows that the contraction in the supply of bank credit caused a reduction in borrowers' investment and employment levels (Chodorow-Reich (2014), Gan (2007) , and Almeida et al. (2012) ), my study shows that the effects of the banking crisis could be felt by firms that were not directly linked to troubled banks.
The paper is important in light of the burgeoning literature on inter-firm networks (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Atalay, Hortacsu, Roberts, and Syverson (2011), Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) , Jacobson and Von Schedvin (2013) , Boissay and Gropp (2013) , and Wu (2016)). These papers highlight the importance in thinking of how idiosyncratic shocks might travel through the economy through inter-firm linkages and may ultimately lead to aggregate fluctuations. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that not only can shocks pass to linked firms, but they may also amplify as the travel through the network. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to model the entire network of firms, my results provide the first step in showing that the trade credit channel is an important mechanism to transmit banking shocks, and it may produce measurable implications at the aggregate level. After is set equal to one for all months between the same period. The pre-trend period picks up the observations in the 5 months preceding my treatment period. Control variables include the After indicator interacted with: (1) size, which is defined as the supplier's pre-period average quarterly total assets; (2) cash, which is defined as the supplier's pre-period average cash scaled by assets; (3) age, which is calculated as the pre-period average of the supplier's current date less the first date the observation appeared in Compustat; and (3) nBuyer, which is calculated as the average number of unique buyers for each supplier in the pre-period. Standard errors are clustered at the supplier level and are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
(1) Collections is an indicator variable equal to one if one of the buyer's payables was transferred to a collections agency. Finally, in column 4 the dependent variable is
Covenant
Viol. which is set equal to one if the customer had a technical default on one of his debt contracts. The variable
Exposed is an indicator variable set equal to one if the buyer was linked to a treated supplier during the treatment period. All other variables are as previously defined. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level and are reported in parentheses.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
(1) Compustat. The variable Exposed is an indicator variable set equal to one if the buyer was linked to a treated supplier during the treatment period. All other variables are as previously defined. Column 1 estimates the effect of exposure on employment for the whole sample, while column 2 estimates the effect of exposure on employment for the subsample of firms that are larger than the median firm, and column 3 estimates the effect of exposure on employment for firms that are smaller than the median firm. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level and are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
(1) In columns 1 through 4, the dependent variable is the log of current receivables, and in columns 5 through 7, the dependent variable is the sum of three months of receivables data scaled by Compustat sales revenue.
All other variables are as previously defined. Standard errors are clustered at the supplier level and are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
(1) . Column 1 is estimated using OLS, and the variable of interest is the average change in lending during the crisis period for the borrower's pre-crisis syndicate. In the remaining columns, the change in loans are instrumented using Lehman, ABX, Balance Sheet, and All instruments. The variable Lehman cosyndication exposure equals the fraction of the bank's syndication portfolio where Lehman Brother's had a lead role in the loan deal. The variable ABX exposure equals the loading of the bank's stock return on the ABX AAA 2006-H1 index between October 2007 and December 2007. The balance sheeet and income statement items include the ratio of deposits to assets at the end of 2007, the ratio of trading revenue over assets, and the ratio of net real estate charge-offs over assets. For each firm, the bank-level measures are averaged over the members of the firm's last pre-crisis syndicate, with weights assigned according the the share of the loan retained. Additional Dealscan controls include multiple lead lenders indicator, loan due during the crisis indicator, credit line indicator, collateral indicator, number of covenants, and all in drawn spread. Standard errors are clustered at the lead lender level and are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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